Foreign Relations,
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, South Asia,
1969-1972
Released by the Office of the Historian
BANGLADESH
NOTE
This is the first
National Intelligence Estimate on Bangladesh. Hence, more background
data than usual on social, economic, and political
conditions are included. Though the statistics are the
best available, most should be regarded as rough general indicators.
There are other peculiar
problems in estimating about the country. These include its newness, the
untested nature of its institutions, the lack or limited relevance of
historical precedents as criteria for estimative
judgments. There is also the uniqueness of an independent country suddenly facing problems of population and poverty on
the scale involved here - a matter previously obscured by the area's
incorporation into a larger entity. These problems are
especially acute in relation to long-term political assessments, which
is uncharted territory. Fundamental aspects of the economy are more
familiar, but new uncertainties have been introduced
here as well - particularly as retards relationships between the course
of economic developments and related political or social questions. This
Estimate should be read with these caveats in mind.
SUMMARY
A. With about 75 million
people living in a small, predominantly rural area, Bangladesh is the world's most
overcrowded country, and one of the poorest. In contrast to the peoples of the
other states of the subcontinent, Bengalees are for
the most part ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, and live in a fairly
egalitarian society. There are some tensions, however, between the
predominantly Muslim majority and the Hindus who make up about 15 percent of
the population.
B. Bangladesh's
population, growing at a rate of between 2.5 and 3.5 percent a year (statistics
are unreliable), could double in 20-25 years. Population control efforts
have so far not been effective and are not likely to have much impact for many
years, if ever.
C. The
Bengalee economy is primarily agricultural, with most
farmers living at the subsistence level. Prospects for large-scale
industrialization are poor. Until the mid-1960s, the area enjoyed a trade
surplus, exporting such products as jute, paper products, and tea. In recent
year, changing export markets and increasing imports of food have given it a
trade deficit. The government is now seeking to increase the production of
export commodities and of food.
D. The 1971 wars
inflicted serious damage on some sectors of the economy, particularly on
transportation facilities. Relief and reconstruction efforts, both by the
Bangladesh Government and by outside sources have been fairly successful.
E. Foreign aid is
playing a critical role both in rehabilitation efforts and in financing
agrarian development. To date, Bangladesh
has received about $1 billion in pledges of aid (about a third from the US); it plans
to have spent about half that by mid-1973.
F. Bangladesh's economic
prospects are unpromising. It will need substantial foreign aid in the next few
years, but cannot be sure that it will get it. It will probably be able to
maintain sales of jute, the principal export, but will find it difficult to
expand them appreciably. The rice harvest in the current crop year (July
1972-June 1973) will be disappointing, but production may rise in later years.
The government plans to increase the production of rice so as to be
self-sufficient in food by 1975. To do so will require heavy and successful
application of the inputs of the Green Revolution and the prospects for success
must be considered uncertain. At best, Bangladesh will see a constant race
between an exploding population and efforts to feed itself.
G. The new Bangladesh
administrative apparatus, despite considerable ineptitude, is in control of the
country. Now a functioning and accepted institution, it could probably survive
any but the most critical challenge. Serious law and order problems which
existed in early 1972 have been alleviated, though not fully solved, by the
recruitment of a new police force and army. We judge that these services can
maintain an acceptable level of public security against the kinds of threats
they are likely to be faced with.
H. Prime Minister Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) and his party, the Awami
League, dominate Bangladesh's
political life. Barring an electoral upset in March 1973, they will continue to
do so. Mujib will continue a moderate posture at
home, and a non-aligned one abroad.
I. Mujib
is so important to the political system that his departure would be a traumatic
event, though chaos would not automatically ensue. His successor would come
from his political party, and might be forced to rely on the new armed forces
to remain in power.
J. The country's
enduring economic troubles will assure continued political difficulties -
though not necessarily calamity. Even with Mujib in
office, Bengalee politics are likely to see a process
of radicalization, though perhaps not as severe as that in the neighboring
Indian state of West Bengal. Pan-Bengalism may become a rallying cry for some elements in Bangladesh, but a union of Bangladesh with West Bengal
will be highly unlikely.
K. Bangladesh's poverty
and weakness set severe limits on the role it will play in the subcontinent and
on the world scene. It will seek amicable relations with neighboring South
Asian and Southeast Asian states, and will hope to get as much economic
assistance as it can from the world's principal powers. Consistent with its
relations with India,
it will play a generally passive role on the world scene and will try to avoid
offending most outside states.
L. The
USSR's efforts to cultivate Bangladesh
have been quite extensive. The Soviets are probably seeking to ensure that the Bengalees will continue to work with them and the Indians
in preference to establishing working relations with China. they may hope to gain access
to repair or supply facilities in Bangladesh' ports in connection with their
Indian Ocean naval presence; but there is no evidence that they have asked for
such access, and Mujib has repeatedly said that he
has no intention of granting such privileges to any foreign power.
M. India is and will
probably remain the most influential external power in Bangladesh, and
both states will likely find it advantageous to continue close relations. But Bangladesh is
not a satellite. It will take Indian interests into account and will be
inclined to avoid major actions repugnant to New Delhi,
but within these limits, Bangladesh
will act independently.
THE ESTIMATE
I. THE COUNTRY AND ITS
PEOPLE
1. In December 1972, Bangladesh
celebrates its first anniversary as an independent state. It faces difficulties
of staggering dimensions - a huge population, widespread poverty, inadequate
food production, serious war damage, uncertain trade prospects, internal
dissension, and a none too competent bureaucracy
saddled with major new responsibilities. A case can be made that its prospects
are hopeless.
2. But such gloomy
prognoses do not necessarily apply to this unique country. Most of its grave
troubles have existed for some time, more or less hidden because the area was
usually considered as a component part of larger Pakistan. (When East Pakistan was
aggregated with the relatively prosperous, uncrowded
west wing, more comforting statistics results - the reality being apparent only
when a separate Bangladesh
is analyzed.) And the new state can count on some assets. Its people are
industrious; they are inured to hardship and privation; they are enthusiastic
about their independence. The breakup of Pakistan has meant, overall, an end to
exploitative foreign rule of East Bengal, giving it the chance to use its
resources for itself.*
__________________________
* A detailed assessment of the overall costs and benefits of the former
Pakistani union is outside the scope of this paper. The economic exploitation
of the east wing by the west was probably not as bad as the Bengalis thought it
was; indeed they did derive advantages from the old arrangement. The fact
remains, however, that from 1947 on, East Pakistan provided a disproportionate
share of its own resources for the west wing's benefit, without profiting
equally in return.
3. Geographically, Bangladesh is small; with 53,000 square miles,
it is roughly the size of Arkansas or
Louisiana. Aside from
the sparse population of the hill tracts, most of the 75 million Bengalees live in a waterlogged
lowland of floodplains and delta formations - the product of three major
rivers. The alluvium formed by them and their numerous tributaries and
distributaries has formed an almost perfectly flat landscape who
elevations range from the sea up to 200 feet above sea level in the far north.
The rivers serve as major means of transport and communication, provide
abundant supplies of fish, and deposit silt which maintains enough fertility to
permit farming. The rivers rise and fall, and their flooding during the
May-October monsoon season are major determinants of agricultural output. Too
much or too little water, or proper amounts coming too
soon or too late can mean major crop failures.
4. Bangladesh is
overwhelmingly agricultural. Rice, the dietary staple, is grown on 80 percent
of the cultivated area. It and jute, the principal cash crop, dominate the
rural scene. The two often compete for the same acreage. Yields of rice are
comparatively low. Most farming is of a subsistence nature. Transportation
facilities, particularly railroads, are limited. Energy sources are scarce.
There is some natural gas, but deposits are localized and distribution through
the country difficult. Other exploitable minerals have so far been found only
in marginal quantities. There is substantial timber in the 15 percent of the
country not a part of the deltaic plain.
5. Barring a few
city-states such as Hong Kong,
Bangladesh -
with nearly 1,400 people per square mile - is the most densely populated
country in the world. (Were the US
as crowded, it would have some 4.5 billion residents.) The population appears
to be growing at a rate of from 2.5-3.5 percent a year, possibly even higher
(statistics are not reliable). If the rate is 3.5 percent, the present
population of 75 million or so would double in 20 years.
6. The Bangladesh
Government, like its predecessor, has acknowledged the need to check the
population explosion, but its efforts in this regard remain comparatively ineffective.
That element of the regime now charged with family planning is apparently one
of the more inept of official departments in a government not noted for
competence. Its efforts achieved relatively little in the Pakistani era, even
though the government gave high priority to population control. Public
disinterest, ignorance, and a shortage of trained personnel and facilities will
continue to be major barriers. In sum, population control efforts are not
likely to have much impact for many years, if ever.
7. In such
circumstances, emigration to the neighboring, even though crowded areas of
India, and such disasters as mass starvation, epidemics, storms and wars have
been - and could be again - the only means working to contain the growth of
population. Between 1947 and 1970 some five million people, nearly all Hindus, left East Pakistan for India. Another 10
million (80 percent Hindu) fled during the 1971 civil war, but returned
following Pakistan's
defeat. Over time, many Hindus are likely again to move to India, though
not so rapidly or on such a massive scale. According to the Bengalee
government, a half million people died in the huge cyclone of November 1970,
and three million in the hostilities of 1971 (the actual number was probably
much less). Deaths by disease induced by malnutrition are uncountable, but
probably numerous.
8. Even with so many
people in so little space, cities are few and small. Only Dacca,
the capital, has more than a million inhabitants; only Chittagong, the major port, has anything
approaching that number. Most towns are entrepots,
markets, shipping centers, and processing facilities for nearby farms.
According to the Bangladesh Government, 94 percent of the population lives in
rural areas and is sustained mainly by agriculture. The great bulk of these
people continue to live according to the patterns of a deep-rooted, cohesive,
and traditional and social system.
9. Poverty is the norm.*
Average annual per capita income is $50-70. Half the population
have serious deficiencies in caloric intake while over 80 percent have
some kind of deficiency in vitamins. About 17 percent of the people are
literate and most students do not get beyond elementary school. Technical and
vocational skills are in short supply.
_____________________________
* "Bangladesh
would appear to be a rather unique phenomenon in the world. Nowhere else in the
world is there anything like so much of poverty shared by so many squeezed into
so little a land area." Bangladesh
Annual Plan 1972-1973.
10. Though the educated
unemployed are a problem, Bangladesh
is not plagued as is Sri
Lanka with numerous liberal arts graduates
permanently denied those white collar jobs which are the only ones they will
accept. Indeed, the expulsion of the prewar non-Bengalee
elite, the prospects of university graduates could be temporarily brightened.
Even so, the 10,000-20,000 students now at the
University of Dacca
are already a troubling political force in their own right and the government
is trying to restrict university enrollments because of limited job
opportunities.
11. In contrast to India and Pakistan,
Bangladesh
has a generally homogeneous society. Only two to three percent of the population, broken down into two distinct groups, do not
speak Bengali as their first language. There are about a million tribal
residents of the Chittagong Hills area; closely related to the primitive nearby
residents of Burma and
northeast India,
they remain isolated and are unlikely to have much impact on national life. Perhaps another million or so residents are the so-called Biharis. These are Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees and
their descendants from northern India.
Formerly treated as a privileged class by the ruling Pakistanis, the Biharis are now an oppressed people. Living in scattered
ghettos and encampments in the cities, they are ostracized and persecuted. The
Bangladesh Government shows little interest in assisting them even with basic
necessities. This situation in unlikely to change even though many Biharis have technical, professional, and managerial skills
that Bangladesh
urgently needs. Their future, barring an improbably resettlement in Pakistan, is grim, but they are unlikely to be
of political or social consequence for Bangladesh itself.
12. Muslim-Hindu
hostility remains a reality in Bangladesh.
It brought about the creation of East Pakistan
in 1947 and led to the departure of the Hindu landlords and businessmen who
until then had dominated the area's social and economic life. Muslim Bengalees still fear a return of this expelled elite group
which now lives in the Indian state of West Bengal.* But the Hindus who remain
(now about 15 percent of the population) pose no particular threat nor do they
have much influence on society. About half of them are so impoverished that
they chief aim is survival the remainder form a better educated group whose
skills, for example, as teachers are urgently needed in the new state. Communal
disturbances in Bangladesh
do occur periodically, but they have been and probably will be relatively small
and severely dealt with. The Bengalee government's
condemnation of all religious persecution probably reflects the prevailing
national attitude, at least towards those Hindus still in Bangladesh.
________________________
* West Bengal has 45 million people, of whom
roughly 20 percent are Muslim. Unlike Bangladesh,
it is heavily industrialized, mostly in and around the city of
Calcutta.
13. Bangladesh's society is not merely homogeneous, it is also relatively egalitarian and free of
class rivalries. The flight of Hindu landlords in 1947-1948 and the subsequent
expropriation of their property has led to the
widespread ownership of very small farms. There are very few large or absentee
landowners. Thus in 1966 (and there has been little change since) only four
percent of land holdings were of 12.5 acres or more, 45 percent were between
2.5 and 12.5 acres, and 51 percents were less than 2.5 acres. (About 30 percent
of those living in the countryside are landless laborers.) Social and economic
gradations of course exist as between the educated and the illiterate and
between the landless laborers and owners of small plots. But unlike Pakistan
or West Bengal, Bangladesh has no important class of
the rural wealthy with big estates and many bitter enemies.
14. The convulsions of
1971 saw a leveling in Bangladesh's
small urban and industrialized society. Most industry had been set up, owned
and managed by West Pakistani and Bihari
entrepreneurs.* Their property included nearly all the area's banks; shipping
companies; jute, textile, and paper mills; and food processing plants. With the
advent of civil war in March 1971, they began shipping out what could be moved,
and eventually fled themselves. In the war's aftermath, the new Government of
Bangladesh took over their abandoned firms. It then nationalized nearly all the
remaining plants in the country and put their management in the hands of Bengalee civil servants.
II. THE ECONOMY
15. In the short term, Bangladesh's
major task has been the repair of war damage, the resettlement and feeding of
refugees, and the revival of prewar economic activity. Simultaneously, but
extending into longer term is an effort to raise export earnings and reduce
food imports through increased crop yields.
16. Bangladesh's
economy is principally agricultural and is likely to remain so. Its planners
recently described it as follows:
In the most recent
normal year, large-scale manufacturing contributed only about 6 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) while the modern sectors, including modern
transport, organized services, power, modern construction and manufacturing,
together contributed to more than 15 percent of GDP. Agriculture and ancillary
activities, contributing well over two-thirds of GDP, have mainly been
subsistence activities. Thus, the economy is rather devoid of any obvious
sources of reinvestable surplus.*
____________________________
*Bangladesh Annual Plan, Fiscal Year 1973. GDP in 1970 was roughly $4.5
billion. It was probably somewhat smaller in 1972.
Most manufactured and
consumer goods and a portion of its food are imported. The Bengalees
pay for these with earnings from the export of basic commodities, principally
jute but also timber products, tea, leather and a few others. Until the
mid-1960s, the area enjoyed a trade surplus.
17. Foreign Aid. Static
export levels and increasing imports, particularly of food, had made Bangladesh into
a deficit area with a rising need for foreign aid even before the 1971 crisis.
Since independence, it has received generous amounts of outside assistance. As
of August 1972, it had received commitments of about $900 million in foreign
aid, both for relief and for longer term economic development.* The principal
donors - given both bilaterally and through the UN - were:
COUNTRY
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
U.S................................335
India..............................270
Canada.............................65
UK.................................50
USSR...............................70
Miscellaneous (mostly .........113
Japan and West Europe)
___________________________
* In most cases it is impossible to isolate the aid
serving one purpose or the other.
Pledges since,
principally from a World Bank subsidiary, the International Development
Association, but also a new $50 million trade credit from the USSR, have
brought the level to about $1 billion.
18. As of December 1972,
India
had given 900,000 tons of food grains, transport equipment, money for refugee
resettlement, a $13 million foreign exchange loan, and had helped to repair damaged
bridges. Canada
had provided mostly food. The US
had committed over 1 million tons of food grains, 75,000 tons of edible oil,
and had resumed development projects suspended during the fighting - as had the
Soviets. The latter's projects include a thermal power plant, an electrical
equipment factory, and radio transmitters. The Soviets also gave some food,
fishing trawlers, and transport equipment. In addition they are clearing the port of
Chittagong at a cost as yet unspecified.
Between half and two-thirds of all foreign aid has been
grants, with the remainder chiefly long-term development loans. As of 30
June 1972, about $115 million of all aid extended had been spent. There are no
later figures on amounts drawn down, but the government's first annual plan
calls for spending about $500 million of foreign assistance in the period July
1972-June 1973.
19. Relief and
Reconstruction. With this aid, and their own efforts as well, the Bengalees have made substantial progress. Nearly all the 10
million refugees who had gone to India in 1971 have returned and
have been resettled with few apparent difficulties. Emergency food shipments,
the initial handling of which has been done by UNROD (United Nations Relief
Operation Dacca), have averted critical food shortages this year. Production of
jute, after a sharp decline during the war, has returned to normal. The tea
plantations, however, were badly crippled; even with extensive new investment
they could not operate at former levels for several years. Given static world
demand and the intense competition from other tea producers, such heavy
investments are unlikely, and tea production will remain low.
20. Bangladesh's
small industrial plant suffered little physical damage in 1971, but revival of
its activities has been hampered by new, inexperienced manager, by severe
restrictions on raw materials and spare parts imports, and by damage to
transportation and communications facilities. The latter were severely hurt in
the war; they are now functioning again, but at lower than prewar levels. The
ports have been largely restored to operation, as has road transport, although
about 25 percent of the nations fleet of trucks was
destroyed. The railways were badly damaged and remain a major bottleneck by the
last quarter of 1972, rail transport was operating at
only 40 percent of prewar capacity because of damage to bridges, rolling stock,
and signal equipment. Return to normal operations is probably a year or two
away. But the problem has been alleviated by the substitution of additional
river craft (both imported and of domestic manufacture) for transport in this riverine country.
21. Foreign Trade
Prospects. Secession from Pakistan
has in some respects improved Bangladesh's
world trade position in that it is no longer a captive market for the west
wing's goods. The previous sizable inter-wing trade and financial transfers -
which mostly worked to West Pakistan's benefit
- have ended. In addition, Bangladesh
has not yet assumed obligations to repay a part of Pakistan's $3 billion international
debt - though it will probably in time accept some of that burden. The overall
consequences of the loss of trade with Pakistan cannot be assessed as yet.
There may prove to be inducements for the resumption of trade but these will
not be the deciding factors in whether political relations are restored or not.
22. The Bengalees are now seeking to renew their exports and find
new sources of imports. The Bangladesh Annual Plan projects export earnings in
the fiscal year July 1972-June 1973 as follow (contrasted with previous highs
including trade with West Pakistan):
COMMODITIES
AMOUNT* PREVIOUS RECORD HIGH
(Millions of
Dollars) (Year)
Raw Jute....................................145..............................$187
(FY 67)
Jute
Manufactures...........................120...............................193
(FY 70)
Tea..........................................19...............................59
(FY 67)
Paper and Newsprint..........................10...............................23
(FY 69)
Leather and Miscellaneous....................50.............................Not
Available
____
Total.....................344
_____________________________
* In addition $25-50 million a year is likely to be received in remittances
from Bengalees living abroad. All these figures are
calculated in Bengalee takas
at a rate of 7.29 takas = $1.
23. When issued, these
targets appeared realistic, even conservative. In the period July 1970-June
1971, during which time the civil war had started, total exports had amounted
to about $359 million. In the past, a small proportion of jute exports and
almost all tea and paper went to protected markets in West
Pakistan; finding at least some substitute markets for them seemed
feasible. Jute markets still exist elsewhere. But export performance up to the
close of calendar year 1972 has been disappointing. After an initial surge
early in the year, jute sales have dropped below hoped-for levels. This lag may
be temporary, as a lack of shipping facilities held back shipments in the
latter part of 1972. If the shipping problem is overcome, and it is too early
to know whether it will be or not, jute earnings could come close to those
targeted. Tea and paper exports have been only a small fraction of those
projected, however, and their future (particularly that of tea) is
uncertain.
24. The FY 1973 Annual Plan envisaged imports of some $840 million (as compared
with East Pakistan's imports of something less
than $600 million in FY 1970*), allocated as follows:
$125
million...Reconstruction, rehabilitation
164 million...Development (1/3 for agriculture)
551 million...Maintenance imports, food, consumer goods, invisibles
These were to be paid
for by $497 million in foreign aid and $344 million of export earnings. But
foreign aid is now paying for nearly all imports. A severely
restrictive government import policy (except for food), inexperienced
and inefficient traders, and a lack of business confidence have virtually
prevented commercial imports. Thus, despite disappointing export earnings, Bangladesh's
foreign exchange reserves, negligible in December 1971, had risen to over $200
million in November 1972.
_________________________
* According to official Pakistani statistics, imports were $734 million in that
year, a figure derived by using the official value of the Pakistani rupee in
calculating inter-wing trade. But the latter was overvalued by about 100 percent;
when recalculated at this value, the figure of less than $600 million results.
25. Public Finance. The
regime's financial position appears to be manageable. The July 1972-June 1973
non-development budget estimates ordinary domestic revenues of about $400
million and expenditures of $310 million. Two-thirds or so of receipts are to
come from customs and excise taxes, the remainder from income and corporation
taxes and profits from nationalized industries. Half of expenditures will go to
"civil administration", most of the rest to education and defense
(about $50-$60 million each).
26. There is also a
development budget of about $700 million which could make up unexpected
shortfalls in the regular budget. Thirty six percent of this amount is to be spend on relief and reconstruction, nearly all the rest on
development projects, principally in agriculture and transportation. Seventy
five percent of the development budget is to be paid for by foreign aid,
including counterpart funds from food sales, the remainder by the surplus in
the regular budget and by local borrowing. Official estimates of both total
receipts and expenditures are probably on the high side. As rough general
guidelines, however, they do not appear to be wildly unrealistic. Barring a
major miscalculation or unexpected disaster, the government should be able to
function without critical fiscal difficulties at least in the next year or two.
27. Food Production:
Short- and Long-Term Outlook. Bangladesh
has not been able to feed itself for many years, and has had to import
increasing amounts of food.
BANGLADESH:
RICE PRODUCTION
AND FOODGRAIN IMPORTS
Thousand Metric Tons
__________________________________________
CROP
RICE
FOODGRAIN IMPORT
YEAR*
PRODUCTION
Wheat Rice Total
1961...........9,620
234 464 698
1962...........9,620
202 206 408
1963...........8,870
894 542 1,436
1964..........10,620
656 346 1,002
1965..........10,500
250 95 345
1966..........10,500
529 360 889
1967...........9,580
647 432 1,079
1968..........11,170
712 308 1,020
1969..........11,340
884 236 1,120
1970..........12,010
1,045 502 1,547
1971..........11,140
898 381 1,279
1972**.........9,970
1,350 500 1,850
___________________________________________
* Ending 30 June
** Preliminary
28. The 1972 crop year
(July 1971-June 1972*) comprised both a period of fighting and one of initial
relief efforts; it saw a poor harvest of 10 million tons of rice, with
shortfalls made up by emergency food shipments. 1.7 million tons of food grains
were imported between January and August 1972, and another million will
probably have been delivered by January 1973. Dacca had hoped to grow 12 million tons of
rice in the July 1972-June 1973 period, but this now appears out of reach.
Droughts have reduced the size of the summer and winter crops to the point that
even a good spring harvest would mean only 10 million tons for the year. Bangladesh can
thus expect difficult times by early 1973, and food shortages could go on for
many months. The price of rice has already gone up sharply, and has led to a painful
increase in the cost of living. The government is seeking more emergency food
aid and is purchasing food on the world market. It hopes to get from all
sources about 2.5 million tons in the calendar year 1973, about the same it
will receive in 1972. A detailed UN study just released substantiates this
figure as a reasonable estimate of what will be needed.
____________________________
*There are three harvests during each crop year, in the summer, winter, and
spring. They represent about 25, 60, and 15 percent respectively of annual rice
output.
29. Its efforts have
been made difficult by a decline in the world of availability of cereals. Large
Soviet purchases of grains from the US
and other countries and poor harvests in neighboring India have made food costly and
scarce. Indeed, there was considerable smuggling of food from certain areas of Bangladesh into India in the summer of 1972. It is
still too early to say that Bangladesh
will see a major food crisis in 1973. Much will depend on the amount of food
that can be obtained from abroad and on how well the Bengalee
government will be able to distribute it. Distribution in 1972 was assisted by
UNROD. The latter expects to be reduced to an advisory status in the next few
months, putting an additional burden on the Bangladesh Government.
30. As for longer term
agricultural prospects, great benefits could come from major flood control
efforts, which would harness Bangladesh's three great rivers and end the area's
periodic floods and droughts. These are more feasible than in the past, as they
require close cooperation with India
- which was impossible when the Pakistanis ruled. But the engineering works
involved would be very expensive and take a long time to complete. Thus the Bengalee government has written in general terms (really
aspirations) of a $1.5 billion program to be completed by 1985. Such a scheme
would probably require international financing even greater than the huge Indus
Valley Project in West Pakistan. Not merely is
such funding highly uncertain, but major technical problems are involved.
31. But some benefits
are likely to come from more modest and shorter term efforts to help the
farmers. In the next few years several hundred million dollars will probably be
spent on agricultural development projects. Prominent among these will be ones
for the procurement of much larger amounts of fertilizers, pesticides, improved
high yield rice seeds which can be used in Bangladesh, tube-well drilling for
dry season crops, flood control projects for limited areas where this is
feasible, and agricultural credit and extension programs.
32. It is impossible to
estimate the success of these schemes. Potential pitfalls are numerous. Bangladesh will
remain susceptible to vagaries of flood and drought; the new rice may not grow
successfully, the traditional Bengalee farmers may
not be amenable to the technology of the Green Revolution. The widespread
ownership of small plots may prove an obstacle to the innovations of the Green
Revolution, e.g., as these involve irrigation schemes. But there appears a good
chance, if the announced plans are carried through the next few years, that increases in rice (and jute) yields will result.
Whether the country will become self-sufficient in food by 1975 as planned
remains to be seen; indeed it may find intensified cultivation of jute at the
expense of rice more beneficial - if with increased export earnings it can buy
food abroad more cheaply than it can grow rice at home.
33. The Industrial
Sector. There are, in Bangladesh,
demands that the tiny industrial sector be expanded, particularly to produce
the consumer items formerly bought from West Pakistan.
But prospects for this are poor. Nor are larger capital goods industries
comparable to those which have been built in India likely to be developed. There
are virtually no entrepreneurs or private investment capital to finance such
projects. Foreign private investment is discouraged by the new regime's
nationalization of industry. The government itself will be able to divert few resources
from the major agricultural efforts to which it is committed. Sources of energy
and power remain limited, and even now the present small complex of industry -
now under new and inexperienced management and afflicted with labor unrest -
will find itself hard-pressed just to restore operations. In these
circumstances, Bangladesh
will remain mainly a producer and processor of agricultural commodities.
34. Overall Economic
Outlook. Our knowledge of the Bengalee economy is far
from comprehensive. Far more than in the field of politics, there is
considerable historical evidence still relevant to economic questions, but
current data are incomplete; analyses must necessarily be partly
impressionistic, and so must projections.
35. The country's
overall economic prospects in the next few years will principally depend on:
(a) output of the agricultural sector; (b) export earnings; (c) foreign aid
receipts. There is some reason for optimism that agrarian development projects
will indeed boost the output of rice and jute, though by how much is still
unpredictable. Export earnings will depend mainly on world demand for and
pricing of jute. Competition from synthetic fibers has kept jute sales static
for several years, and may in time actually reduce them. While jute sales may
regain prewar norms and even register some small gains, say through aggressive
sales campaigns and competitive pricing, long-term prospects for the export of
this commodity are not promising.
36. Bangladesh
seems assured of substantial quantities of foreign aid for the next year or
two. Increased rice and jute production, if great enough, could over time
produce enough of a trade surplus to reduce or even eliminate the need for aid.
Such a development is, however, probably years away, if indeed it ever comes to
pass. For the longer term, how much foreign aid it will need to any particular
time, or get, cannot now be estimated.
37. Even if Bangladesh
greatly raises rice output and jute sales and gets a great deal of aid, it
faces a probably insuperable obstacle to major economic advance. The huge
population will continue growing; it could double to size in 20-25 years. These
new people will literally eat up most gains. The population might - though no
specific time or numbers are possible because there are no precedents for a
country like this one - reach such size that Bangladesh could no longer support
all or even a substantial portion of its people. At the same time it should be
noted that the Bengalees are accustomed to extreme
hardship and have shown a great ability to adjust themselves to a degree of
privation and difficulty that others would find intolerable.
III. THE NEW BENGALEE
GOVERNMENT
38. Administration. When
Bangladesh became independent in late 1971, its new government found itself with
a host of responsibilities and reduced means of carrying them out, though the
old East Pakistani administrative apparatus remained generally in being. Many
of the top and even middle-level civil servants in East
Bengal had been West Pakistanis. Many Bengalees
in the former East Pakistani civil service had been killed, exiled, or
imprisoned during the troubles (some 12,000-16,000 are still detained in Pakistan).
Others were arrested as collaborators. With managerial skills already in
critically short supply, particularly at the middle and lower levels, the new
regime had to take on or promote ill-qualified people not merely to handle the
tasks of the former government, but also to supervise the repair of war damage,
the return and sheltering of refugees, the feeding of the destitute, the
restoration of security, the suppression of lawlessness, and the operation of a
number of commercial and industrial enterprises formerly in private hands.
39. Not surprisingly, Bengalee administration has suffered from widespread
incompetence, inefficiency, and corruption. In some areas, local administration
was taken over by guerrilla commanders. A few of them are apparently still in
charge, though the center is slowly expanding its control. Top officials
throughout the government appear to be generally well-trained and competent,
but the qualities of those at middle and lower level generally leave much to be
desired. There has been considerable meddling by Awami
League notables in administrative matters. Many of the accomplishments of the
first year of independence were due to the direct activity of foreign
governments and personnel. Thus important emergency relief and reconstruction
measures - particularly food distribution - have been administered directly by
the UN and various outside countries. Similarly, most large-scale
reconstruction projects, e.g., the repair of bridges and clearing of ports and
harbors, have been carried out by foreign governments. The rebuilding of most
private homes and villages has been done mostly by the people themselves, using
their own resources and labor.
40. At least initially,
practically any decision of any consequence had to be made by the Prime
Minister himself. That situation has since improved. With most major initial
tasks completed, the bureaucracy, particularly at the center, now appears to
generate enough momentum to function in a more or less "normal"
manner. Some of the most blatant and harmful forms of corruption have been
checked through arrests and dismissals. Even though it displays considerable
ineptitude, the new Bangladesh Government appears to have established itself as
a functioning and accepted institution and could probably survive any but the
most severe and disruptive changes in the country's
political, economic, and social life.
41. Public Order. Bangladesh
faced a serious public security problem when it became independent. The old
East Pakistani police and security services, made up mostly of Bengalees, had been disrupted and dispersed by the
Pakistani Army. During the civil war the area was infiltrated by some 30
thousand well-armed guerrillas. A large number of fire-arms, either provided by
the guerrillas by the Indians or captured from the Pakistanis, remained in
private hands at war's end. In early 1972, the government tried to retrieve
these weapons but with very limited success. A Bengalee
official has estimated that a hundred thousand weapons are still held illegally
throughout the country.
42. During 1972, Bangladesh
has seem a large number of armed robberies and other
crimes of violence in both the cities and countryside. Many of these are
private crimes of the sort that traditionally have been common in the area, but
others appear to have been politically motivated, e.g., murders of individuals
who had collaborated with the Pakistanis or who were leading rival parties and
factions. The latter will almost certainly increase in the election campaign of
early 1973. Save in the tribal hill areas these violent acts have no had any of
the connotations of an insurgency or a widespread armed uprising against the
government. Paralleling this have been unsettled conditions in the cities.
Trade unionists and refugees from outlying areas have demonstrated - sometimes
violently - for better living and working conditions.
43. In the past year,
the regime has found means of containing these elements, though not completely.
It has done so in part by recruiting a new national police force. The latter is
eventually scheduled to have 75,000 men. So far it numbers about half that, with
equipment and standards of training still below par. The government has also
organized some paramilitary bodies (with about 20,000 men) to help it maintain
order. It has permitted some semi-official irregular forces, some of which have
been helpful while others have occasionally become problems themselves.
44. It now appears
likely that the government will be able to maintain an acceptable level of
public security against the kinds of threats it is likely to be faced with,
particularly as the Bangladesh Armed Forces grow in strength and capability.
The army now has about 20,000 men, the air force and navy a few hundred each.
Some air force personnel, including pilots, are receiving training in the USSR, and Bangladesh
expects to receive a squadron of jet fighter-bombers from the USSR when the
trainees return. Another 24,000-28,000 military personnel are still being held
in Pakistan;
most may be integrated into the armed forces when they finally return. The
army's only real responsibility will be the maintenance of internal security.
Beyond the internal security role, the Bengalee armed
force do not have and are not now expecting to acquire serious capabilities
either for offense or defense.
45. Whether the army
might also become a political force in its own right, as did the Pakistani
military, remains to be seen, Its officer corps will
differ from the Pakistani one in that its leading figures will not come from a
conservative elite of landowners and tribal leaders out of sympathy with a
democratic regime. In Bangladesh's
relatively egalitarian society, no such class exists.
IV. TO DOMESTIC
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
46. Bengalis are
political animals and what is now Bangladesh has, in the past, seen
periods of lively political activity. While these offer some clues for the
future, the country is still so new as an independent
state that the estimates of likely political developments must be tempered with
extra caution. Not only are political precedents lacking and historical
experience of limited usefulness in political prognoses about this state, but
there are also more general long-term uncertainties about how such unequaled
poverty and population stability or even governablility.
47. In 1945 and 1946
elections were held for a Bengali provincial legislature; the All Pakistani
Muslim League, demanding an independent Islamic nation, captured most seats in
what is now Bangladesh.
In 1947 the League became the ruling party of the new country and of the province of
East Pakistan. It did not distinguish
itself, exhibiting infighting, effectiveness, and corruption. In Bengali eyes
it also became associated with West Pakistani dominance. In 1954 free elections
were help for a new east wing provincial legislature, and the Muslim League was
overwhelmingly crushed by a United Front coalition. One of the parties in the
Front was the Awami League (AL),* founded and headed
by H.S. Suhrawardy. It
stood for great political autonomy, "Bengal
for the Bengalis", and for social and economic reforms.
____________________________
*Originally the Awami Muslim League and an offshoot
of the Muslim League. "Awami" means
"peoples".
48. In the United
Front's cabinet was an Al legislator named Sheikh Mujib
Rahman--usually known as Mujib--who
had already spent over two years in a jail because of
his agitation the Muslim League's theocratic and anti-Bengali policies. The
front soon collapsed, Suhrawardy and the Al became
important fixtures in the Pakistani politics of the era, while Mujib rose in influence in the part. Suhrawardy
( who dies in 1963) and Mujib
were jailed when the military took over in 1958. But the AL
organization remained intact, particularly in East
Pakistan, and was formerly revived by Mujib
in 1965. It was periodically active there, even under the heavy-handed and
restrictive controls of Ayub's regime; thus Mujib was one of the leaders of an unsuccessful effort to
defeat Ayub in a presidential election campaign in
1965.
49. A sequence of events
from 1966 on transformed Mujib and the AL from just
another East Pakistani politician and party to Bangladesh's unchallenged leader
and dominant political organization. These include: Mujib's
1966 proposal of a program ( the "Six Points") calling for almost
complete provincial autonomy within the framework of a weak Pakistani
confederation; his arrest and trial on trumped up treason charges; rioting in
early 1969 which toppled Ayub and freed Mujib; the December 1970 elections in which the AL got 74
percent of East Pakistan's popular vote; and the March-December 1971 civil and
international wars which Mujib was arrested, nearly
executed, and released, and triumphantly returned as father of his country and
its unchallengeable leader.
50. Despite the
continued incidence of violent crime, increased student and labor unrest,
government ineptitude, suspicions of a powerful India and many other problems
afflicting the new state, Mujib remains very much in
charge. He is generally viewed as a "moderate" in his political and
economic views. A sincere secularist, he is strongly opposed to religious or
communal discrimination. Mujib has permitted a
general measure of freedom, has tried to restore the rule of law, and has
pushed through a new constitution. The latter provides, among others, for a
bill of rights, parliament and cabinet system, a strong Prime Minister, an
Ombudsman, and an independent judiciary. It also seeks to discourage the
instability which had characterized earlier East Pakistani governments, by
automatically expelling any member of its Parliament who votes against his
party.
51. Elections for a
Parliament under the new constitution will be help in March 1973. It is
difficult to say which parties the AL's
most prominent opponents will be. Most of the formerly important offshoots of
the Muslim League and the reactionary Islamic Parties have been banned because
of their religious bias and association with the Pakistanis. The aged Maulana Bhashani's extremist
National Awami Party/Left has not appeared strong or
impressive. There are Bengalee Communists, but to
date they are few in number. The AL's
strongest challengers will most likely be new organizations like the leftist
National Socialist Party, led by a former student leader (Abdur
Rab) and a freedom fighter (M. A. Jalil).
This group is trying to exploit such issues as continued lawlessness, corruption,
poverty and too close an association with India. Mujib's
stature and the AL's organization--apparently pervasive, efficient, and even
ruthless--as well as the absence of credible alternatives, make his party the
favorite to win, though probably not with so crushing a majority as in 1970.
But this election, like most other free ones in South Asia,
is subject to uncertainties. Mujib can hardly hope
that in office to increase the popularity he enjoyed on his return, and erosion
of support for the AL
may prove significant.
52. If Mujib and the AL emerge as strong victors, most future
significant Bengalee political developments will
probably be within the Awami League itself. Like Pakistan's Muslim League and India's Congress Party, the AL united people of divergent groups in a
successful independence struggle. Like them, it will probably fragment sooner
or later, creating new groups inspired by personal rivalries and ideological
split. There are no precedents or present clues in Bangladesh to predict when this
will happen or what new factions will stand for. Adjacent West
Bengal has, over the years, seen a process of radicalization, with
extremist organizations. e.g., the left wing Communists,
gaining enough strength so as to be voted into power on occasion. With
this has developed an ultra-revolutionary force, the so-called Naxalbari Communists or Naxalites.
Mostly students and young intellectuals. eschewing participation in electoral processes, advocating
Maoist-type peasant revolts but usually engaged in urban terrorism, the Naxalites have periodically posed a serious threat to West Bengal's social and economic life.
53. This could spill
over into Bangladesh.
Calcutta
remains the intellectual and cultural center for all Bengalis. The ideas of
Calcutta's extremists are bound to appeal to Bangladesh's
underpaid trade unionists and intellectuals, landless laborers, politicized
students with bleak futures, and its educated unemployed. Indeed
Dacca's students have
already voted to back more radical economic and social policies. But Bangladesh's
brave economic problems will not automatically lead to extremism or violence,
much less chaos, though they will probably ensure continued political
difficulties. A repetition of West Bengal's experience is far from certain; there are some
important differences between the two areas. The explosive class antagonisms
between industrialists and workers, large landlords and tenants do not exist in
the more egalitarian Bangladesh.
Calcutta has a far larger pool of unemployable
intellectuals than Dacca.
Even so, extremist ideas and programs will probably receive increasingly
greater acceptance - though how far this process will go and how long it will
take is uncertain. In any case, Mujib himself is
likely to remain essentially centrist and moderate and will resist movements
demanding more drastic social economic measures and methods.
54. Actual prospects for
reunification of the two Bengalis are slight. Until 1947, the whole of Bengal was one unit, and Bengalis on both sides of the
border still share great pride in their history, language, and culture. Some
old economic links have been restored. Periodically there has been talk of the
creation of a new separate, united Bengal of
120 million people. Certainly the Government of India would not countenance any
such move. And even if it would, Hindu-Muslim antagonisms remain too strong. A
completely independent Bengal would see the
Hindus unhappily consigned to a permanent minority. But a united Bengal's being absorbed into India, which is a s likely as an
independent one, would leave the Muslims as second-class citizens. Though Mujib and AL are opposed to it, Pan-Bengalism
could become a popular political rallying cry, no matter how futile its real
prospects were.
55. Mujib's
importance is so great that his disappearance from the scene whether by
retirement, defeat, or death would be a major and traumatic event. Chaos would
not automatically ensue, however. The rural, traditional nature of the society
produces its own inertial force. The Awami League and
the Bengalee government and security services are
functioning, nation-wide institutions. The regime has- despite some continuing
lawlessness, violence and urban unrest- apparently acknowledged as Bangladesh's
legitimate authority. Mujib's successor as Prime
Minister would come from AL.
The most likely candidates now appear to be Tajuddin Ahmen, the Minister of Finance; Syed
Nazrul Islam, formerly President of the government in
exile; or Abu Sayeed Chowdhury,
the current President (a figurehead post). But they (who spent most of 1971 in
Calcutta running the Bangladesh government-in-exile) and
other known candidates are relatively colorless, uninspiring party officials
with little personal following and appeal.
56. If post-Mujib Bangladesh
Government (or one still headed him) were unable to generate public support and
allowed serious and widespread disruption, the new Bengalee
army would probably be called in (or move in) to restore order. In the
generally successful campaign to suppress smuggling to India in late
1972, the army showed itself a national force to be reckoned with. Though its
ability to cope with a massive uprising is untested, the area has historically
been kept under control by very small number of regular soldiers. Thus until
the crises of the early 1970's, there were only 10,000-15,000 West Pakistani
troops in East Pakistan. The military is loyal
to Mujib, and probably would be to his successor;
there is no evidence available to us of serious anti-regime sentiment in the
officer corps, though there have been some complaints (followed by dismissals)
in the army about the alleged pro-Indian bias of the government.
V. BANGLADESH AND
THE WORLD
57. Bangladesh's
poverty and weakness set severe limits on the role it will play both in the
subcontinent and not the larger world scene. Virtually devoid of resources, its economic and military power are negligible. It is of
little intrinsic strategic significance to any country except India. It has
been mired, along with India
and Pakistan,
in a stalemate over restructuring their relationships after the 1971 war.
Dacca's principal demands are that Pakistan recognize Bangladesh as an independent state and that the
35,000-45,000 skilled Bengalee military and civilian
personnel now in Pakistan
be returned. Beyond this, Mujib's regime insists it
will try an unspecified number of Pakistanis for war crimes. It demands
allocations to Bangladesh
of a proportionate share of such old Pakistani Government-owned assets as the
national airlines. Dacca has indicated that it would be willing, in principle,
to work out an acceptance of its share of the obligation of the old Pakistani
national debt- trough negotiations to achieve this appear to be a long way off.
58. On its own, Bangladesh has
virtually no means of compelling the Pakistanis to do anything: even the POWs
it wishes to try are in Indian custody. India
hold most of the high cards, Pakistan the rest; the current
impasse is effectively between them. Though the Indians appear to be cooling to
the idea of war crimes trials and reportedly have advised Mujib
to drop this plan, they still publicly support his right to conduct them. even if new Delhi were to
abandon all or part of its support of Bangladesh
so as to achieve a detente with Pakistan,
there would be little that the Bengalees could do
about it. But Bangladesh
remains a factor because India
continues to back it.
59. Neither the fact
that Bangladesh exists as a result of Indian military action, nor the heavy
amounts of economic assistance political support extended by New Delhi mean
that Bangladesh is an Indian satellite or puppet. Nor is it likely to become
one. The Bengalees value their newly acquired
independence and do not wish again to surrender it. They will remain residually
suspicious of their huge Hindu neighbor (anti-Indian sentiments are now being
voiced in Bangladesh).
They are not dependent, as is Nepal
for example, on India
for access to the outside world, nor would they be particularly vulnerable to
threats of an economic embargo. Even so, the Bengalees
will not wish to see themselves pressured or threatened by an angry or
unfriendly India.
The latter's power is so great in relative terms as to inhibit Bangladesh's
ever getting too far out of line.
60. Indian interest in
maintaining in Bangladesh a
state friendly to India was
manifest in the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation
with Bangladesh
in March 1972. This treaty assures India,
among other things, that Bangladesh
will not be a party to actions or activities inimical to India. Its
defense provisions, although not including any agreement to come automatically
to each other's aid, prescribe mutual consultations in the face of aggression.
The treaty could be invoked by India
not only against inimical activities in Bangladesh
by external powers but also against the use of Bangladesh as a sanctuary by Indian
dissidents.
61. Both countries will
probably continue to see their best interests served by maintaining close
relations, whatever the difficulties, e.g., communal frictions, cross-border
smuggling, that might appear. New Delhi prizes a
friendly Bangladesh
into he strategic north-eastern part of the subcontinent .
The Bengalees in turn know that a determined and
antagonistic India
could make life very difficult for their country. Another regime in Dacca, say
one pressing for the acquisition of West Bengal, or one moved by Muslim
hostility to all things Hindu, or one conspicuously pro-Chinese, could change
this completely and bring on an era of hostility. But such contingencies now
appear to be comparatively remote.
62. The USSR's efforts to cultivate the new state have
been extensive: it is clearing the port
of Chittagong, has provided other
emergency relief, and had begun to train and supply Bangladesh's tiny air force, and
has sent diplomatic and technical assistance missions. Some 10 or so Soviet
minesweepers and auxiliary craft are scheduled to remain engaged in harbor
clearing operations at Chittagong
throughout 1973. But in financial terms, Soviet aid has been relatively
limited--some $120 million out of an overall total of $1 billion. The Soviet Union's motive for its policy is subject to some
dispute. The Soviets are probably seeking to ensure that the Bengalees will continue to work with them and the Indians
in preference to establishing working relations with China. They may hope to gain access
to repair or supply facilities in Bangladesh in connection with their Indian
Ocean Naval presence; but there is no evidence that they have asked for such
access, and Mujib has repeatedly said that Bangladesh
has no intentions of granting such privileges to any foreign power. They show
no signs of trying to preempt Indian influence, but at the same time probably
wish some degree of independent ties so that relations with the new South Asian
state are not entirely conditional on the ups and downs of Soviet Relations
with New Delhi.
Whatever Moscow's motives, its efforts have been well received; the image of
the USSR stands high in Bangladesh, though the country wishes, for sound
economic and political reasons, to remain non-aligned with respect tot all the
great powers.
63. Bangladesh remains on poor terms with China. This is
due to Peking's continued support of Pakistan
in the latter's South Asian bargaining--one manifestation of which was the
Chinese veto of Bangladesh's
application for admission to the UN. Were a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani
negotiations to occur and China's
posture to soften, Dacca would be eager to
establish political and economic ties with Peking.
64. Generally,
Dacca looks to the US,
Western Europe, and Japan
as its most important sources of economic aid and its
principal export markets. Relations with all have been fairly good so far, and
the Bengalees will seek to keep them so. This
includes ties with the US,
which has been the largest single source of outside assistance. The coolness or
wariness which now prevails in India
with respect to the US is
not generally seen in Bangladesh
though some public resentment of the US does exist there. This will be
exploited by Bengalee politicians, particularly
during the upcoming election campaign. But the government itself is unlikely to
associate itself, say with the USSR
or India, in moves or
organizations which would antagonize the US or other Western counties. (Nor
would it join any anti-Soviet, anti-Indian grouping.) Even so, as US and other
foreign emergency relief programs are phased out, and as lower aid levels
become the norm, the Bengalees will resent these
reductions--particularly if they come to believe that the Pakistanis are
getting as much or more then they are.
65. There are, besides India, very few countries in
the non-communist world with which Bangladesh seeks any but ordinary
and correct bilateral ties. It does put a high premium on its relations with
the UK.
On independence, it applied for membership in the common wealth. Its acceptance
(followed by Pakistan's withdrawal), the presence of many Bengalees
in England, a favorable regard for London's posture during the 1971 wars, and
long-standing cultural ties have made the British something of a special case.
The Bengalees have pegged their currency directly to
the pound and have kept most of their exchange reserves in British Banks.
66. Though it is one of
the world's largest Muslim states in terms of population, Bangladesh's relations with the principal
Islamic states of the Middle East have
generally ranged from bad to non-existent. Most Arab countries, and Turkey and Iran,
have long had extremely cordial relations with Pakistan which in some cases
extended to close military cooperation. They sided with the Pakistanis in the
latter's 1971 clash with India,
and regarded Bangladesh
as the creature and puppet of the Hindu state. To some extent they still do,
though the situation will almost certainly ease over time. Even so, any sort of
a close cooperative association of Bangladesh and Middle Eastern
powers will remain out of the question.
67. Mujib
has long regarded Bangladesh
as much a Southeast Asian as a South
Asian State.
Since independence, he has established political and economic ties with several
countries in the area including Indonesia, but almost certainly hopes to
benefit from new arrangements set up after the end of fighting there. An
impoverished Bangladesh--itself
devastated by warfare--wishes to receive substantial material assistance in the
context of postwar Southeast Asian international rehabilitation efforts. Beyond
this, Dacca will probably seek profitable
economic relations with major Asian powers, particularly Japan. Its aim
will be greater amounts of both public and private economic assistance, greater
export markets, and the most favorable sources of imports. Given Bangladesh's gross poverty amend major problems
it is no more likely to play a significant role in Southeast or East Asia than it will in the Indian subcontinent.
68. In sum, Bangladesh's foreign posture is characterized by
strong ties with India
on the one hand, and virtually no close connections with any other country.
Save Pakistan,
now remote and no threat--politically, militarily, or otherwise--it has no
enemies. Bangladesh's
interests will be served by seeking trade with and aid from the more advanced
nations of the world, whatever their ideological persuasions. It needs as much
help as it can get, as few enemies as possible. In
such circumstances, it will consistent with its relations to India, play a
generally passive role on the world scene, and will try to avoid offending
outside countries.