Foreign Relations, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Released by the Office of the Historian

 

Department of State    TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 DACCA 04591 020254Z

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ACTION AID-20

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083225
P R 011101Z NOV 72
FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7711
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USE DACCA 4591

JOINT EMBASSY - USCOR MESSAGE

NEW DELHI PASS WILLIAMS

 

SUBJECT: MUJIB REQUESTS MORE FOODGRAINS

REF: (A) DACCA 4454, (B) DACCA 4497

 

1. CHARGE INVITED To CALL ON PRIME MINISTER NOV 1. MUJIB CAME TO POINT IMMEDIATELY AND IN ORDER MEET EXPECTED SERIOUS SHORTAGE IN NEAR FUTURE, REQUESTED USG SUPPLY FOODGRAINS ASAP, FIRST SHIP TO ARRIVE IN JANUARY. ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UNROD ASSESSING FOOOGRAIN REQUIREMENT AND MAY ISSUE APPEAL FOR FURTHER FOOD AID BUT ASSERTED THIS TOO SLOW A PROCESS. TO UNDERLINE URGENCY OF NEED, MUJIB SAID HE WILLING BUY FOODGRAIN UNDER LONG OR SHORT TERM CREDIT OR EVEN FOR CASH. SAID BD ALREADY BUYING FROM BURMA, THAILAND, JAPAN, AND SINGAPORE.

 

2. CHARGE RESPONDED BY STATING USG WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP WITHIN OUR LIMITED AVAILABILITIES, IN UN CONTEXT, WITH OTHERS CONTRIBUTING THEIR SHARE. EMPHASIZED NEED FOR ADEQUATE DATA BASE AS REATIONALE FOR REQUEST, AS SOUGHT WHEN FOOD AID DISCUSSIONS HELD WASHINGTON EARLY OCTOBER WITH FINANCE MINISTER AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN PLANNING COMMISSION. ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IN ORDER TO GET FOODGRAINS HERE BY JANUARY, ONE ROUTE FOR BDG TO FOLLOW WOULD SEEM BE TO PURCHASE COMMERCIALLY, DRAWING ON CURRENTLY HIGH FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES (87 MILLION POUND STERLING), RATHER THAN WAITING FOR BILATERAL OR MULITERAL ASSISTANCE FROM AFAR.

 

3. CANADIAN HICOM ALSO CALLED IN BY MUJIB. HE REPORTED PITCH WAS MUCH THE SAME. IN SEPTEMBER CANADIANS HAD RESPONDED TO EARLIER URGENT REQUEST BY EXPLAINING THAT SHIPPING NOT AVAILABLE AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE UNTIL MARCH. HICOM SUGGESTED THAT IF AMAN CROP LOW, SHORTFALL WILL NOT BE FELT UNTIL AFTER JANUARY. VICE PRESIDENT, CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, ARRIVING NOV 19 WILL BE WILLING TO DISCUSS CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MEET LONGER-TERM REQUIREMENT AT THAT TIME.

 

4. AUSTRALIAN HICOM SAID HE WAS NOT RPT NOT INVITED BY MUJIB TO CALL. HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY FOOD MINISTER IN MID-SEPT. CANBERRA ADVISED AUSTRALIA LACKED GRAIN EVEN FOR STRAIGHT COMMERCIAL SALE OF 100,000 TONS.

 

5. JAPANESE COUNSELOR REPORTED THAT ACTING ON BEHALF MUJIB, MINISTER INDUSTRIES SOUGHT JAPANESE FOOD AID TEN DAYS AGO. JAPANESE EMBASSY HAS BEEN CABLING TOKYO TO SPEED UP NEGOTIATION RE 100,000 TONS DEFERRED-PAYMENT RICE, BUT ACCORDING COUNSELOR, SURPLUS DISAPPEARING AND NUMBER OF SERIOUS INTRA-GOJ PROBLEMS REMAIN. COUNSELOR THINKING OF RECOMMENDING FOODGRAINS BE PROVIDED AS GRANT. IN RESPONSE TO BDG, COULD ONLY INDICIATE THAT 50,000 TONS OF EARLIER DEFERRED-PAYMENT RICE ARRIVING SHORTLY IN CHITTAGONG.

 

6. IN CALL ON UMBRICHT, UNROD, CHARGE WAS INFORMED THAT CABLE HAD JUST GONE OFF TO UN, FORECASTING 20 PER CENT SHORT-FALL OF FOODGRAIN SUPPLY AGAINST REQUIREMENT. 100,000 TON GAP WHICH UMBRICHT SAID HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO SECGEN APPEAL IN MAY HAD NOW MATERIALIZED. UMBRICHT CITED AS MAIN REASON FOR INADEQUATE PRODUCTION HERE: DROUGHT CONDITIONS, FERTILIZER SHORTAGE, AND LOW NUMBER OF WATER PUMPS PUT TO WORK.

 

7. IN LIGHT WORLDWIDE TIGHTNESS FOODGRAIN SUPPLY, UMBRICHT FELT ONLY WAY SITUATION MIGHT BE RELIEVED HERE WOULD BE BY DIVERTING TO BD US GRAIN SHIP GOING ELSEWHERE. SAID HE HAD RECOMMEDED UN RAISE THIS WITH USG. FYI: UMBRICHT DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY DIVERSION US VESSEL FOR ARRIVAL PRIOR AMAN HARVEST; HOWEVER, WE ADVISED THAT THIS UNREALISTIC. PREVIOUSLY HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED POSSIBLE DIVERSION FOR ARRIVAL IN EARLY 1973. END FYI. ASSUME DIVERSION EARLY 1973 NOT FEASIBLE BUT WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION.

 

8. THROUGHOUT DISCUSSION PRIMIN WAS VAGUE IN HIS REFERENCES TO AMOUNTS AND TIMING OF FOODGRAIN ARRIVALS. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE ESTIMATES CONTAINED PARA 8 REF A ARE WITHIN RESONABLE LIMITS AND THAT, AS PER REF B, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR BDG INITIATE AGGRESSIVE INTERNAL PROCUREMENT POLICIES FOLLOWING AMAN HARVEST.

 

9. QUESTION FOOD WILL REMAIN AT CENTER OF BDG ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONCERN. WHILE FULLY AWARE DIFFICULTIES THESE QUESTIONS POSE FOR WASHINGTON BELIEVE MUJIB'S PERSONAL OVERTURE IMPELS US TO LOOK FOR EARLY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 9 REF A. ALSO URGE IMMEDIATE APPROACH TO UN BE TAKEN TO DETERMINE STATE OF ITS CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE INTERIM APPEAL, EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE AND DIRECT, TO MAJOR FOOD SUPPLIERS.

DECONTROL 11/1/73
NEWBERRY