from the Embassy in the
/1/ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. This telegram was summarized on October 8 by the National Security Council staff in a memorandum for Kissinger to use in briefing the President on October 9. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, October 1-24, 1971)
7529. Subj: Discussion With Gromyko on Indo-Pak Confrontation. Ref: State 185010./2/
/2/ Document 160.
Summary. I called on Gromyko and expressed concern
over Indo-Pak situation. He listened gravely and attentively, agreed that
situation is both tense and complex but otherwise declined to give Soviet
assessment of border situation. He noted with approval that US is seeking to
restrain both sides. He said Soviet side also has approached both sides and
indicated Soviets have faith in Indian assurances but lack of faith in
Pakistani assurances. He warned there are people in
2. I called on FonMin Gromyko Oct 8 and expressed our concern over increasing risks of war along lines reftel. Noting reported Indian and Pakistani military movements, reports of possible cross-border operations by Mukti Bahini, as well as possible Pakistani military attacks across West Pakistan border, I said we consider situation sufficiently serious that we are making immediate representations at highest level in both capitals, urging curb on cross-border operations by all parties and pullback from borders of military forces of both India and Pakistan. I noted that we assume both the US and Soviet Union have strongly shared interest in reducing risks of conflict and expressed hope that Soviet Government would act in any way open to it to bring about both immediate reduction of military confrontation and longer-term objective of political solution.
3. Gromyko expressed satisfaction that US takes measures in
direction of restraining both sides. His government has also made approaches,
of differing natures, to both sides. He said Soviets rely on assurances given
personally by PriMin Gandhi that
reiterated that because of gravity of crisis it was important to take action
with both sides, without apportioning blame, because both are on edge of
hostilities. I noted reports of plans by Mukti Bahini to move large numbers of men across border, with
support of Indian army, and reports of military buildup along
5. Gromyko said that he does not have factual information
about activities of "irregulars" (his word for Mukti
Bahini) on border. He said he does not doubt
situation is tense as well as complex: this was clear at time of his recent
6. I suggested that we keep in touch on this matter. Gromyko replied that he would of course leave open possibility of responding in more detail later and agreed that it would be useful to maintain contact on this subject. He expressed appreciation that I had presented this information to him.
7. Dept repeat as desired.
Source: Document 163, volume XI,