Memorandum from the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/
/1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 626, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Sep-Oct 1971. Secret; Nodis.
Attached is a memo from Saunders which deals with the subject the Secretary has been talking to you about personally and which confirms what Sisco indicated to me last week. You will note that Yahya is sending over a personal emissary/2/ to discuss with Sisco the actual status of items remaining in the pipeline as a further refinement of the proposal.
Major General Inam-ul Haq,
Director General of Defense Procurement in
As you know, Secretary Rogers has done this on his own despite contrary hints. Very few people in the Department are aware of the project according to Eliot. I told Eliot that this project could upset the President a great deal and that it would be well for us to take stock of the situation in the light of Yahya's response and his obviously cooperative but apparently concerned attitude. I believe you will want to focus on this as soon as possible before it progresses any further./3/ The real problem is the large number of unfilled military requests which have been stonewalled by Defense.
/3/ Kissinger responded in the margin with the following handwritten note: "Al-They cannot play fairly. Make sure we are cut in & that Paks know what must be done." Haig added a handwritten note in the margin that reads: "Saunders will be sure Pak General sees HAK."
Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/4/
/4/ Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.
Sisco-Hilaly-Yahya on the Military Aid Pipeline
Ambassador Farland has cabled to you Yahya's reaction to a recent conversation between Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Hilaly in which Sisco indicated that the possibility of the stoppage of economic aid to Pakistan could be averted if the arms flow were shut off. We have no record of the Sisco-Hilaly talk-although the Paks have now provided us with the text of Hilaly's report/5/-and were not previously informed about this approach.
/5/ Ambassador Farland reported on September 1 that Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan had made available Hilaly's account of his recent conversation with Sisco. (Telegram 8934 from Islamabad; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Because of the practice of reducing the size of telegrams by eliminating words considered to be obvious, Farland's report of receiving Hilaly's account on August 23 was taken to mean that the conversation was held that day. The conversation between Sisco and Hilaly took place on August 20; see Document 131.
According to Hilaly, Sisco called him in on August 23 and made the following major points:
-the question of arms shipments had become an important internal political issue in the US with the passage of the Gallagher amendment./6/ There was every likelihood that the Senate would pass a similar restriction which would also insist on the stoppage of economic aid until there is a satisfactory political settlement in East Pakistan.
/6/ See footnote 7, Document 105.
possibility of such a stoppage of economic aid could be averted if the
Administration agreed to cut off military supply to
-It was a mutual problem and both governments needed to help each other and devise a political strategy that could ensure the resumption and increase of economic aid. Sisco, "confidentially and unofficially" suggested that both governments sit together secretly as friends to look at what remained in the pipeline with a view to "announcing" its final close.
According to Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan, Yahya instructed Hilaly to inform Sisco/7/ that (1) the gesture of initiating prior unofficial and confidential consultation on this matter of "vital importance" is appreciated; (2) he agreed that this was a mutual problem which required a common political strategy.
/7/ Yahya's reaction was reported in telegram 8934, cited in footnote 5 above.
Yahya then went on to ask that President Nixon be informed that:
would do well to consider the effect a public announcement of the kind
suggested by Sisco would have on Pakistan internally
and externally and on the image of US-Pak relations. Internally, it would be a
"setback" to the "strengthened good feeling toward the Nixon
(almost as an afterthought in his instructions to Hilaly)
Yahya added that the President be informed that he
"in no way wishes to weaken the position of the Nixon Government.
Therefore, should President Nixon feel that the proposed announcement would
enable him to defeat the Democratic designs to make the existing position a
political issue for the Presidential election,
-Finally, Yahya "notes with deep appreciation" the assurances that the cut off would help the Administration to (1) save economic aid for Pakistan (2) take a stronger line with Congress for resumption of economic aid to Pakistan and (3) to take the lead in the consortium for immediate resumption of international aid to Pakistan.
have talked to Sisco or Secretary Rogers had the
permission of the President, Sisco has been
free-wheeling again. We had no idea until this cable was received from
That issue aside, however, Yahya's response raises some important substantive questions.
1. Yahya realizes that there is very little (about $2.6
million) in the pipeline and that there is virtually no chance with
Congressional pressure that more will be made available in the foreseeable
future. This being the case he may well see this as a unique opportunity to
trade virtually nothing in military supply for vital
Resumption of economic aid to
of military supply to
In short, Sisco is talking about a trade-off that might make sense when the Senate reconvenes. But he has raised it with the Paks without authority, without much sense of what it would take to resume aid and over-arousing Pak expectations about resumption.
Document 138 , volume XI,