Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7,
Released by the Office of the Historian
B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
Maurice Williams, Assistant Administrator, A.I.D.
Ronald Ziegler, Special Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
William Weathersby, Deputy Chief of Mission
Herbert Spivak, Political Counsellor, U.S. Embassy, New Delhi
Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Kaul - Foreign Secretary
Kewal Singh - Secretary (I), Ministry of External Affairs
V. H. Coelho - Secretary (II), Ministry of External Affairs
P. N. Haksar - Secretary to the Prime Minister
K. B. Lall - Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply
I. G. Patel - Special Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance
H. C. Sarin - Secretary, Ministry of Defence
The President and Prime Minister Gandhi joined with Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh about a. m. on August 1
Place: July 31 and August 1 in the Panel Room of the Rashtrapati Bavan
(President's Palace) in
Thursday, July 31 - y. m.
Kaul: Welcome and introductions.
Keating: Thanks and introductions.
President's trip to show
2. Indo-Pakistan relations
Kaul: Invited Kissinger to lead off, perhaps telling some impressions of trip so far.
We have not come to press our views but to hear yours. It is clear that postwar
e~ is at an end when
not on this trip to ask support for any policies. But each nation has an
interest in how war turns out. Each nation will make a judgment on the
intrinsic merits of
message has been that we consider our role to be resistance
of aggression across boundaries. Subversion is an internal matter. But the real challenge of subversion is to prevent it, and that is a matter of 'economic development on which we will help.
Kaul: We hope your visit will lead to greater understanding and cooperation between us.
It is our assessment that Asian countries should be left to solve their own problems in their own way.
are concerned about
nations are suffering great internal problems. Answer to that is not military
alliance but a shift from the military to the social side. We have watched with
great interest the growth of
sub regional organizations, especially under ECAFE. We would appreciate
be interested in your assessment of (1) China,
(2) the Sino-Soviet rift, (3) relations of great powers where they meet in Asia, (4) US views of great power guarantee (political rather than military) of the integrity of the smaller countries of the area.
regard to Indo-Pakistan relations, I must express our concern over resumption
We have some views on
Many of your points with which we would agree. In Communist China traditional
Chinese isolationism and ideology make it difficult for
Sino-Soviet dispute: Two centers of orthodoxy - battles among heretics more bitter than conflicts of national interests. A border with 700 million on one side and 300 million on the other,
President has said that a major military move by any other major power would be looked on with disfavor by us.
Keating: Add a word about our small step toward Communist China.
We would permit tourists to purchase Chicom goods -- a small breach in our
total embargo. Released travel restrictions for some
To say that we are open to contacts is not to say that we look with equanimity
on anything it does.
Sisco: Some systematic efforts are being made to develop closer Chicom-Pakistan relations. We can't say much more than that.
We have impression that Chicom leadership is trying to reimpose control after the Cultural Revolution. We assume army is strong center. What are Indian views?
composition of new politbureau, we judge army in control. Creates
apprehension that Chinese militarism will reassert itself. Japanese and
Soviet assessment is that
Sonnenfeldt: We are interested Indian assessment of Sino-Soviet border tension. Hard to tell whether either side wants to settle border problems. We see no interest in Sino-Soviet hostilities because tension affects poise with which they deal with other problems.
Kaul: In what direction is Chicom nuclear capability going? ABM's?
Kissinger: A small force. One reason why we are developing ABM's. We see our ability to stay well ahead of Chinese"
would be effect of
Main threat is from conventional forces. For
weapons would involve major problem for other nuclear powers.
They have interest in not letting nuclear blackmail become
pattern of international behavior.
question that nuclear attack would present serious problems. We can't specify
our response in advance. A major country being attacked by Communist China
would raise problems for stability of
Sisco: Distinguish conventional from nuclear attacks.
Kissinger: President has said that a significant military attack on major country would be regarded seriously.
not prepared disregard UN charter, despite American popular phrase "no
Kissinger: President has made distinction between conventional cross-border attack and subversion.
Sisco: What is your attitude toward Brezhnev proposal?
were surprised. All we cal tell is that Soviet idea is not military alliance
but general cooperation.
Kissinger: If a non-aggression treaty, hard to know what practical meaning would be.
Kaul: They want dissolution of pacts and substitute something else.
came up peripherally in
Singh: We have hardly any contacts trade, exchanges. although
Every time Pak reply: no normalization unless basic issues are resolved.
Gandhi's renewed no-war proposal met no response.
K. Singh: That was special. Other issues not subject to arbitration.
basic issues: (1)
I only meant
Kaul: East Pakistani problem is inundation, not irrigation. Political problem.
Kissinger: If they don't take your offer, they get nothing?
K. Singh: They get regeneration of the waters below the barrage.
Sisco: Genuine compromises possible. Genuine concern on both sides what future needs might be.
We value good India-Pak relations.
We past habit; of trying to come up with new
We want to avoid an arms race and avoid diversion of resources to military
uses. Recognize legitimate defense needs. Welcome
defense production, ordnance factory from
Each side has military needs, but
Kissinger: We have no interest in an India-Pak conflict. Confronts us with choices we prefer not to have to make. We hope you succeed in normalizing relations. Don't want to aggravate.
Kaul: If you don't want to choose, don't aggravate. Don't repeat mistake of 1954.
No decisions on this trip on military supply policy. Hear views. One criterion
- that stability and progress of
that economic aid to
Only point -
Jung: We will meet again in October.
Kissinger: While under review, no decision.
Kaul: Hold decision until October talks.
Friday, August 1- a. m.
Kaul: Appreciation for yesterday. Patel to lead off on economic relations.
Patel: Indian economic conditions: Last year conditions favorable - exports good - agricultural production good despite less than average monsoon - some inflation but prices now easing off a bit.
Bilateral relations with US: Some issues of January now settled - passing of IDA replenishment - easing of "additionality" requirements - PL 480 now on yearly basis rather than short-term - good AID presentation to Congress. In sum, pleased with new Administration.
1. Prices on things like oil seeds; hope tallow can be included to help hold price line. Confidence building; would hate to see it breached. $8-9 million in tallow - could be included in any financial ceiling.
additionality, US position not clear about application of new policy to
for high AID appropriation - need $385 million in non-project loans to meet
Multilateral agencies: Trends emerging which
to high proportion of IDA and IBRD funds going to
--IMF. Problem arising from proposed revision of quotas. Don't want to see board representation become "rich men's club". Ideal is mutual consultation. Urge complete study of constitutional composition of board.
Development Bank. Proper principle is disbursement by merit. Has
been departed from in tied contributions, e.g., funds tied to procurement in
institutions along wrong course.
"Helpful for your usual brilliance to be reflected in this report".
Don't want to throw gloom into this meeting. But I had talk with President last
evening. He told of "very great difficulty" the Administration is
having with the Congress - "worse than ever this year regarding
additionality problem which forcefully raised in
Rockefeller visit to
Sisco: Since last meeting in Washington (Dinesh Singh) both Mr. Williams and I have testified before Congress on Aid Bill.
The whole rupee problem is of increasing concern to both Executive Branch and of the Congress.
Williams: The Congress is conducting a searching and intense review of the entire aid program. I agree we probably will do little better than last year.
with Mr. Patel that more must be done in the multi-lateral framework. As debt
payments rise it may turn out that the
On rupee problem, we have just signed Rural Electrification agreement, and we happy to pursue similar measures to put them quietly to work.
Kaul: We unreservedly express our appreciation for past aid. But per capita it is perhaps the lowest in the world. Hope you will impress on your Congress that aid is a "vital necessity." Both "we and you" should work to remove misunderstandings in US Congress.
encouraged by President's encouragement for multi-lateral cooperation and
President takes sympathetic attitude toward
US is now in first place among
Many reasons for limits on expansion of US-Indian trade - some
Indian weaknesses some
In relation to
Asian Council of Ministers. Will be easier for them to take 1970 decisions if they knew US capacity to help.
Asian Development Bank. Suggest a payments mechanism to help trade.
importance of definition of
Sisco: Payments arrangement warrants study. We will give consideration.
Trade exceedingly important. Commend
regional economic cooperation, we want to complement,
not compete with
Lall: Could you give us general impression from countries you visited?
Sub-regional cooperation has much to offer - R CD if expanded, for instance.
not a Soviet idea.
Hollen: We have supported regional cooperation in principle. Problem is how to
make this truly attractive to
Kaul: Our view is that economic progress leads to political progress.
Van Hollen: We are examining. Paks would feel anything done on purely economic side would erode their political position.
of us will be interested to hear when we go to
Lall: Other Asian attitudes?
We made clear at every stop that we favor regional cooperation - believe future
Some feared tackling some problems to exclusion of others. Some feared Japanese dominance.
If Asians come up with schemes - regional or sub-regional - we will consider.
Sisco: Basic US-Soviet recognition that it would be foolish if we let Arab-Israeli issues degrade relations between us.
We have parallel interests in preventing hostilities. US interests would be served by stable peace.
1. Intensive exchange on conditions in area itself. Share concern over pattern of violence. But Soviets did not seem to feel renewal of general hostilities imminent.
2. Arms control. Soviet position remains that political settlement must precede.
3. Principal discussion on framework for settlement. We trying to develop a common document to be transmitted to parties through Jarring.
Well out of starting gate but quite short of finish line.
Bilateral exchanges will press ahead, especially between now and opening of UNGA.
We gave Soviets some countersuggestions.
We seeking explicit commitment to peace. Soviets want stable peace - not renewed armistice. We see direct negotiations necessary at some point. Withdrawal necessary. Refugee settlement necessary - principle of choice while meeting Israeli concerns.
No reason to be either optimistic or pessimistic. No conflict between bilateral and four-power tracks.
[The President and Prime Minister joined at this point.]
Keating: Described piece of sculpture to be passed on to the astronauts.
Prime Minister: Say again how happy you have stopped. Talks have helped us know you better - that the main purpose.
We at no time have wanted to create difficulties for US. Our history conditions our views. But we don't want US to do anything to damage its efforts.
President: The Prime Minister and I have met before. But rare opportunity this time for three hours of good talk. We tried on broad level to see political problems in each of our countries and then to put them in perspective.
summarize my views: Moon landing has broadened our thinking. In U.S. Cabinet, a
briefing recently on population - population of world would double by 2000 A.
D. This perspective causes us to think about what the world would be like by
2000 if statesmen fail. Could have two superpowers with enough to destroy the
world with a third -
Here is what we are about:
have the immediate problem of
2. US-USSR. We will talk about arms control, Mid-East, trade - anything to reduce tension. We will not join any anti-Chinese condominium. Good short range but disastrous long range policy. We want as good relations as possible.
We have some very difficult and budget problems in US through 1970. You should not be discouraged. We ought to understand that we both have problems.
Source: Vol E7, State Department documents.