Memorandum
for the Record/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/KISSINGER. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Nodis.
Prepared by Kissinger. Sent by Haig
to the Department of State's Acting Executive Secretary, Robert C. Brewster,
under cover of a July 8 memorandum stating that it was for the exclusive use of
Secretary Rogers, and that a copy had been sent directly to Rogers at the Western White
House in San Clemente, California, where he was then
staying. Another copy of the memorandum in the Kissinger papers shows a
drafting date of July 7. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger
Papers, Top Secret Chronological File, Box TS 4, 1971 July) On July 8 Haig sent the memorandum to President Nixon, under cover of
a memorandum summarizing the report. (Ibid., Geopolitical File, Box TS 58,
Trips: HAK, Chron File July 1971)
New Delhi,
undated.
1. In my
first twenty-four hours in India, I have had full
exposure to the strong Indian feelings about the heavy burden imposed by the
refugees and against what they regard as continued US support for Pakistan. Most are still talking
about the importance of a political settlement in East Pakistan, but I sense an
increasing judgment that Yahya does not have the
capacity to bring this off, certainly not on his present course. There seems to
be a growing sense of the inevitability of war or at least widespread
Hindu-Muslim violence, not necessarily because anyone wants it but because in
the end they fear they will not know how to avoid it.
2. With
Foreign Minister Singh, I began the conversation by saying I felt I owed him as
a point of honor an explanation of developments in regard to arms shipments for
Pakistan since his visit to
Washington. I explained the
evolution of our position since March 25. Only recently did it become apparent
that there was one category of equipment not covered under these steps. I said
that a list of this equipment was now being prepared and would be ready next
week. We would review this. Singh asked that I convey to the President his
strong urging that our arms policy be reviewed with an eye to ending all
shipments. The Indians view these as prejudicial to their interests.
Singh then
asked for a description of our view of US interests in South Asia today. To provide some
measure of reassurance that we take India seriously, I drew this
perspective: India is one of the pivotal
countries of the world because of its size, position, form of government,
example to developing nations and potential contribution to peace and stability
beyond its region. Pakistan, which we have a
special relationship with on several issues, is a regional country of more
special character. I concluded by saying that our commitment to the vitality
and cohesion of India is substantial.
As for our
policy in the present situation, I said the President felt that an
Indo-Pakistani war would be a disaster for both countries and would create the
risk that the subcontinent would become an area for conflict among outside
powers. The President has felt that he had certain influence in Pakistan which could be used to
encourage the Pakistani Government to encourage political solution. We
recognized that the Indians would prefer US to cut off assistance for the shock
effect of that step, but the President had felt that we should do enough to
maintain our influence.
To this,
Singh responded that he felt that President Yahya's
statement of June 28 had snapped the last chances for a political settlement.
He is very doubtful that a political settlement is still possible. From reports
he has from the British, he does not believe Yahya is
being given the full facts about the situation and therefore does not have a
realistic picture of what will be required for a genuine settlement. I said I
had no judgment on this since I had not been to Pakistan but that I planned to
make clear that the US favored a political
settlement.
In a brief
private session, he told me that India would not insist on a
settlement involving the jailed East Pakistani leader, Mujibur
Rahman, but would be satisfied if Pakistan could come up with a
solution that is non-military and non-communal; i.e., is not biased against the
Hindus.
3. With
the Prime Minister, I took the same general line on India's importance without
going into as much detail on the arms shipments. She explained her political
problems: she does not want to use force and is willing to accept any
suggestions. It is a question of how the situation develops and what can be
done practically. She is concerned about Chinese influence growing in East Pakistan. I assured her the
whole point of our policy has been to retain enough influence to urge creation
of conditions that would permit the refugees to go back, although we would not
promise results. I asked how much more time she thought there was before the
situation became unmanageable, and she replied that it
is unmanageable now and that they are "just holding it together by sheer
willpower."
4. With
both Prime Minister Gandhi and the Foreign Minister, I took a few moments
privately to explain the background of the President's policy toward China over the past two years
and to lay the groundwork for increasing contacts. I felt this was essential in
avoiding future charges that, on an issue of vital concern to them we had not
at least confided our general intent. In each case, I made clear that our moves
closer to China derived from the
President's sense of what was necessary for world peace, was in no way directed
at India, and would in the long
run benefit India. Nevertheless, we
would, I said, take the gravest view of any unprovoked Chinese aggression
against India. Singh sought assurance
that the US would provide equipment
in event of attack.
5. Indian
press had emphasized demonstrations on arrival. Incidents
minimal and isolated and Secret Service reports situation generally quiet.
Any reports of conversations you see in press are from Indian sources. I have
talked to no members of the press.
Source: Document
94, volume XI, South Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.