Memorandum
of Conversation/1/
/1/
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138,
Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Middle East, Farland,
Amb. (
PARTICIPANTS
Joseph S. Farland, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David R. Halperin (notetaker)
After an
exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Farland stated
that the State Department had accepted his cover story without question./2/ Mr.
Kissinger expressed appreciation for the cables sent by Ambassador Farland,
and for his loyalty over the past weeks.
/2/
According to a May 4 memorandum from Haig to Nixon,
the meeting between Kissinger and Farland was
arranged as a "covert meeting" on Nixon's instructions. Farland accordingly "arranged a personal pretext"
for an urgent visit to
Mr. Kissinger
then stated that McNamara/3/ was preparing to submit a devastating report
concluding that it would take $250 million to give Pakistan breathing room; he
then asked Ambassador Farland whether it is, in fact,
possible to provide breathing room, and whether $250 million is a realistic
estimate of the support required. Ambassador Farland
replied that although he thought it would be possible, there are some real
problems to contend with:
/3/
Robert McNamara, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank).
-Ambassador
Keating seems to have gone berserk; he has violated security and appears
determined to break
/4/
See Document 19.
-Another
problem is the quality of political reporting in
Moving to
the primary item of business, Mr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Farland that for some time, we have been passing messages
to the Chinese through the Pakistanis. Because of the communications problem,
it had not been possible to inform Ambassador Farland
of this previously, and messages have been conveyed directly to Yahya by the President, or through Ambassador Hilaly. Mr. Kissinger then outlined the exchange of
messages that has occurred to date:
[Omitted
here are Kissinger's detailed briefing on the exchanges with the Chinese and
discussion of communications and transportation arrangements relating to the
contacts.]
Mr.
Kissinger stated that he would talk to McNamara on Monday, May 10, and tell him
that Yahya must be kept afloat for six more months;
one problem will be that McNamara is emotionally against Yahya-as
is the entire liberal community. Ambassador Farland
pointed out that matters won't be helped by the fact that Keating is now on his
way back to conduct a series of conferences, including some with his old Senate
confreres. Mr. Kissinger stated that he would tell McNamara that this is the
only channel we have, and he must give Yahya at least
three months. Ambassador Farland stated that six
months should be the goal.
Ambassador
Farland stated that he had urged Yahya
to tell his staff to make a new presentation to the consortium./5/ Ahmad is
coming to the United States next week, and Ambassador Farland
has stressed this to him. The Ambassador stated that one inherent problem is
that the lower echelon in the Pakistani bureaucracy feels they have a
commitment from China to support operations in East Pakistan. Although Japan is
negative in their position, Ambassador Farland felt
that Germany will not let Pakistan go down the drain and the British will
probably help as well. Mr. Kissinger asked whether the $250 million will be
applied entirely to debt re-scheduling-and whether Yahya
could propose a plan applicable to West Pakistan. Ambassador Farland thought some of the $250 million would be a new
loan, and that a consortium proposal would be geared to East Pakistan with the
West receiving/administering the funds.
/5/
Reference is to the Pakistan consortium, organized by the World Bank to provide
economic assistance to Pakistan. The consortium consisted of Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United
States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the
International Development Association.
Mr.
Kissinger next asked what he could do bureaucratically to help. Ambassador Farland said that the most important contribution would be
to get McNamara to head up the consortium. Mr. Kissinger replied that he did
not think McNamara would agree to this because it would antagonize his liberal
friends. Ambassador Farland then pointed out that the
IMF was another possibility that should not be overlooked. Assali
had previously requested a standby loan from the IMF which was turned down;
however, the loan request could be reactivated. Mr. Kissinger indicated that he
would take this issue up with Peterson or Shultz, and that he would report on
his meeting with McNamara through the Navy channel. [21/2 lines of source text
not declassified] Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was a good idea.
Political
Situation
Mr.
Kissinger asked how it was that the election results were so unexpected.
Ambassador Farland said that everyone has missed in
their predictions. In East Pakistan, Rahman had been
able to capitalize on the cyclone. When the western nations began to pour in
assistance, the Benghalis realized for the first time
that they were part of the world. In the West, everyone had thought the
landowners could continue to retain substantial support.
Ambassador
Farland voiced some mild complaints about living in
Pakistan and expressed the hope that if the China meeting came off
successfully, a new post could be offered. Mr. Kissinger replied noncommittally
that if this gets done, "we will owe you a great debt of gratitude."
Mr.
Kissinger asked if there is any way West Pakistan can hold on to East Pakistan.
Ambassador Farland said no, not in the long run. Mr.
Kissinger then said that all we need is six months. East Benghal
is bound to become an economic disaster; Chinese influence will grow there, and
it will not be possible to win any permanent friends there. Ambassador Farland agreed and pointed out the difficulty of making a
financial commitment to the Benghalis.
Ambassador
Farland asked if Mr. Kissinger could have Hannah pass
the word down through regular channels that we are going to work things out and
support the government. Mr. Kissinger said he would insure this gets done.
Ambassador Farland then said that our interest in
trying to save Pakistan be conveyed to the heads of government in Britain,
Germany-and possibly also Japan. Mr. Kissinger replied that he might be going
to Britain on other business and would speak to Heath about this. Ambassador Farland pointed out that at this point, the other members
of the consortium do not know our position.
Summary
Mr.
Kissinger indicated, by way of summary, that he would:
(1) Have Hannah told that we want a positive attitude and six months time;
(2) Talk to McNamara along the lines above;
(3) Look into the IMF Loan;
(4) Personally talk to Heath;
(5) Have Rush/6/ talk to Brandt/7/ in two weeks time-or, in any event, before
the end of the month; and
(6) Possibly get the State Department to get to Japan if there is a convenient
way to do this.
/6/
Kenneth Rush, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.
/7/
Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Mr.
Kissinger then asked Ambassador Farland to check back
with him if at any point he received instructions from the Department which
were intolerable.
[Omitted
here is further discussion of contacts between the United States and China.]